Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Read online

  9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”

  True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: “To plan secretly, to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy’s intentions and baulk his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding a drop of blood.” Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things that

  “the world’s coarse thumb

  And finger fail to plumb.”

  10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength; to see sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

  11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

  Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “He who only sees the obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the surface of things, wins with ease.”

  12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for wisdom nor credit for courage.

  Tu Mu explains this very well, “Inasmuch as his victories are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the world at large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage.”

  13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.

  Ch’ên Hao says: “He plans no superfluous marches, he devises no futile attacks.” The connection of ideas is thus explained by Chang Yü: “One who seeks to conquer by sheer strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win.”

  Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.

  14. Hence the skilful fighter puts himself into a position which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

  Position need not be confined strictly to the actual ground occupied by the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his army.

  15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.

  Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: “In warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured.”

  We make this wide encircling movement in the Mediterranean, having for its primary object the recovery of the command of that vital sea, but also having for its object the exposure of the underbelly of the Axis, especially Italy, to every attack.

  Winston Churchill, debate in House of Commons (1942)

  16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his power to control success.

  There is a very strong temptation … for government forces to act outside the law, the excuses being that the processes of law are too cumbersome, that the normal safeguards in the law for the individual are not designed for an insurgency and that a terrorist deserves to be treated as an outlaw anyway. Not only is this morally wrong, but, over a period, it will create more practical difficulties for a government than it solves. A government which does not act in accordance with the law forfeits the right to be called a government and cannot expect its people to obey the law. Functioning in accordance with the law is a very small price to pay in return for the advantage of being the government.

  Sir Robert Grainger Ker Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (1966)

  17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.

  18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.

  It is not easy to distinguish [these] four terms very clearly. The first seems to be surveying and measurement of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy’s strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison of the enemy’s chances with our own; if the latter turn the scale, then victory ensues.

  19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

  Literally, “a victorious army is like an i (20 oz.) weighed against a shu (1/24 oz.); a routed army as a shu weighted against an i.” The point is simply the enormous advantage which a disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralised by defeat.

  20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep. So much for tactical dispositions.

  V. ENERGY

  The battle swayed. Half-naked men hacked slowly at each other As the Greeks eased back the Trojans. They stood close; Closer; thigh in thigh; mask twisted over iron mask / Like kissing.

  Christopher Logue, War Music (1987)

  Wang Hsi expands [“energy”] into “the application, in various ways, of accumulated power”; and Chang Yü says: “When the soldiers’ energy has reached its height, it may be used to secure victory.”

  1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same in principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

  That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu reminds us of Han Hsin’s famous reply to the first Han Emperor, who said to him, “How large an army do you think I could lead?” “Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty.” “And you?” asked the Emperor. “Oh!” he answered, “the more the better.”

  2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

  3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this is effected by manœuvres direct and indirect.

  We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun Tzu’s treatise, the discussion of chêng and ch’i. As it is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two terms, or to render them at all consistently by good English equivalents, it may be as well to tabulate some of the commentators’ remarks before proceeding further… . Chia Lin: “In presence of the enemy, your troops should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure victory abnormal manœuvres must be employed.” Mei Yao-ch’ên: “Ch’i is active, chêng is passive; passivity means waiting for an opportunity, activity brings the victory itself.”

  Ho Shih: “We must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus chêng may also be ch’i, and ch’i may also be chêng.” He instances the famous exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin-chin, suddenly threw a large force across the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his opponent. Here, we are told, the march on Lin-chin was chêng and the surprise manœuvre was ch’i… .

  A comment of the T’ang Emperor T’ai Tsung goes to the root of the matter: “… The whole secret lies in confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.” To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other operation is chêng on which the enemy has had his attention fixed; whereas that is ch’i, which takes him by surprise or comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a movement which is meant to be ch’i, it immediately becomes chêng.

  4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science of weak points and strong.

  5. In all fighti
ng, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory.

  Chang Yü says: “Steadily develop indirect tactics, either by pounding the enemy’s flanks or falling on his rear.” A brilliant example of “indirect tactics” which decided the fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts’ night march round the Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war.

  6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away but to return once more.

  Here we simply have an expression, in figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great leader.

  7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can ever be heard.

  8. There are not more than five primary colours, yet in combination they produce more hues than can ever be seen.

  9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes, yet combinations of them yield more flavours than can ever be tasted.

  10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of manœuvers.

  11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

  12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which will even roll stones along in its course.

  13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.

  As applied to the falcon, [this quality] seems to me to denote that instinct of self-restraint which keeps the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, together with the power of judging when the right moment has arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very instant at which it will be most effective. When the “Victory” went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear worked fearful havoc on the enemy’s nearest ships.

  14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

  Wang Hsi’s note … : “This is just how the ‘psychological moment’ ought to be seized in war.”

  15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; decision, to the releasing of the trigger.

  16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

  Mei Yao-ch’ên says: “The subdivisions of the army having been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question.”

  17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline; simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates strength.

  Tu Mu … put it quite plainly: “If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding strength.”

  18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy; masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical dispositions.

  Chang Yü relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the first Han Emperor: “Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated cattle to be seen. The result was that the spies one and all recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone opposed them, saying: ‘When two countries go to war, they are naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, and it would be unwise for us to attack.’ The Emperor, however, disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself surrounded at Po-têng.”

  19. Thus one who is skilful at keeping the enemy on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the enemy will act.

  Tu Mu … points out … : “If our force happens to be superior to the enemy’s, weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy’s movements should be determined by the signs that we choose to give him.” [Note this] anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendant of Sun Wu … : In 341 B.C., the Ch’i State being at war with Wei, sent T’ien Chi and Sun Pin against the general P’ang Chüan, who happened to be a deadly personal enemy of the latter. Sun Pin said: “The Ch’i State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account.” Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. P’ang Chüan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: “I knew these men of Ch’i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away by more than half.”

  In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow defile, which he calculated that his pursuers would reach after dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed upon it the words: “Under this tree shall P’ang Chüan die.” Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a light. Later on, P’ang Chüan arrived at the spot, and noticing the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his whole army thrown into confusion.

  He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.

  20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

  21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined energy, and does not require too much from individuals.

  Tu Mu says: “He first of all considers the power of his army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into account, and uses each man according to his capabilities. He does not demand perfection from the untalented.”

  Hence his ability to pick out the right men and to utilise combined energy.

  22. When he utilises combined energy, his fighting men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.

  23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.

  The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu’s opinion, is the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden rushes. “Great results,” he adds, “can thus be achieved with small forces.”

  VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG

  Troops are (or should be) trained to exploit their dominant weapon’s strong points… . War is a chess game in which both the value of the pieces and the nature of their possible moves vary both with the training of the pieces and the skill of the individual player.

  Theodore Ropp, paraphrasing Von Clausewitz, in War in the Modern World (1959)

  Chang Yü attem
pts to explain the sequence of chapters as follows: “Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself first with the theory of attack and defence, and then turns his attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or indirect methods arises out of attack and defence, and the perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the chapter on Energy.”

  1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle, will arrive exhausted.

  2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be imposed upon him.

  One mark of a great soldier is that he fights on his own terms or fights not at all.

  3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

  In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy will have to defend.

  4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

  The king who is endowed with personality and the material constituents of sovereignty and on whom all right policy rests is called the conqueror. That which encircles him on all sides and prevails in the territory immediately adjacent to his is … known as the enemy… . A neighboring prince having the fullest measure of antagonism is an enemy. When he is in difficulty, he should be attacked; when he is without support or has weak support, he should be exterminated. In contrary circumstances [when he is strong or has strong support], he should be harassed or weakened.

  Kautilya, Artha Sastra (fourth or third century B.C.)