Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Page 7

  10. By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshalling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the gradations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

  11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

  12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:

  13.(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law?I.e., “is in harmony with his subjects.”

  (2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

  (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

  (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

  Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts’ao Ts’ao (A.D.155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed his horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice by cutting off his hair. Ts’ao Ts’ao’s own comment on the present passage is characteristically curt: “When you lay down a law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed, the offender must be put to death.”

  (5) Which army is the stronger?

  Morally as well as physically.

  (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

  Tu Yu quotes [another commentator]: “Without constant practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand.”

  (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

  That is, on which side is there the most absolute certainty that merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?

  It is certainly for the interest of the service that a cordial interchange of civilities should subsist between superior and inferior officers, and therefore it is bad policy in superiors to behave toward their inferiors indiscriminately, as tho’ they were of a lower species, such a conduct will damp the spirits of any man… . Cheerful ardor and spirit … ought ever to be the characteristic of an officer … for to be well obeyed it is necessary to be esteemed.

  John Paul Jones (1776)

  14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

  Who does what, and how the activities are organized (in counterguerrilla or guerrilla warfare), is far less important than understanding the mission and being determined to accomplish it by means not inconsistent with the mission. So long as a sufficient number understand the mission and what it implies, seek to accomplish it with a dedication and an intelligence not substantially inferior to that of the enemy, and receive adequate political support, the counterguerrilla effort should not usually be difficult.

  Lt. Col. Charles Bohannan and Col. Napoleon Valeriano, Counterguerrilla Operations (1962)

  15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer:—let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one be dismissed!

  The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu’s treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron, Ho Lü, king of the Wu State.

  16. While heeding the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

  17. According as circumstances are favourable, one should modify one’s plans.

  Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the “bookish theoric.” He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; “for,” as Chang Yü puts it, “while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favourable position in actual warfare.” On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The Duke listened quietly and then said, “Who will attack first to-morrow—I or Bonaparte?” “Bonaparte,” replied Lord Uxbridge. “Well,” continued the Duke, “Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?”

  18. All warfare is based on deception.

  The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson [Lt. Col. G. F. R. Henderson, author of Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War (1898) and The Science of War (1905)] tells us that Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially distinguished by the “extraordinary skill with which he concealed his movements and deceived both friend and foe.”

  This is the great, famous line from The Art of War, quoted through the ages. DG

  19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

  20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

  21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

  22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

  Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon him.

  23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.

  24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

  To what Federal soldier did it occur, on the morning of Chancellorsville, that [General Robert E.] Lee, confronted by 90,000 Northerners, would detach the half of his own small force of 50,000 to attack his enemy in flank and rear? … [The Battle of Chancellorsville] took place in May 1863. Lee’s maneuvers, in conjunction with General Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson’s devastating surprise attack, are still studied in military academies.

  George Francis Robert Henderson and Sir Thomas Barclay, “War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, eleventh edition (1910)

  25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

  This … is perhaps the best sense to be got out of the text as it stands. Most of the commentators give the following explanation: “It is impossible to lay down rules for warfare before you come into touch with the enemy.”

  26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.

  Chang Yü tells us that in ancient times it was customary for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate his plan of campaign.

  The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.

  II. WAGING WAR

  Coin is the sinews of war.

  François Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel (1532)

  An army marches on its stomach.

  Napoleon I, quoted in Mémorial de Ste-Hélène, by Emmanuel, comte de Las Cases (1823)

  The main themes of this chapter—the costs of war, the speed with which it is waged, the need to secure good lines of supply, and the requirement of fast movement (fluidity)—are essential to battle, be it guerrilla or traditional warfare. Particularly in the case of fluidity and its concomitant, negative space, these concepts were at one time
considered quintessentially “Asian” by military historians.

  European culture, contrariwise, they would claim, put its stock in masses, blocks, and bulk. Broadly conceived, think of skyscrapers and epic poetry versus pagodas and haiku, boxing versus tai chi, the huge destroyers of World War II versus kamikazes. Apples and oranges, of course, but that’s the point. The images pose for us a singular difference in cultural emphasis and era. Influential anthropologist Franz Boas insisted that “great” cultures could be divined by the size of their cities and monuments, their accumulation of goods. In the media-dense, peripatetic world of today, where multinational peacekeeping forces exchange notes across borders, those differences are melting away, but in American wars as recent as Korea and Vietnam, the differences literally gave rise to success or loss in battle after battle.

  The first translation of The Art of War into a Western language was by a French Jesuit, Jean-Joseph M. Amiot, in the late 1700s, and it caused a great stir. We can be reasonably sure that Napoleon I was aware of the military and scientific ideas of the Chinese. He would have seen the work as confirming his own strategic credo of fluidity: not being where the enemy expects you, appearing always where he least expects, and extraordinary speed in battle. Napoleon insisted in his Maxims: “One must be slow in deliberation and quick in execution.” DG

  Ts’ao Kung has the note, “He who wishes to fight must first count the cost,” which prepares us for the discovery that the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.

  1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,

  The swift chariots were lightly built and, according to Chang Yü, used for the attack; the heavy chariots were … designed for purposes of defence… . It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers… . We are informed that each swift chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen or infantry, and each heavy chariot by 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a hundred men.

  with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,

  2.78 modern li go to a mile. The length may have varied slightly since Sun Tzu’s time.

  the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armour, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

  2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, the men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardour will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

  The greatest good deed in war is the speedy ending of the war, and every means to that end, so long as it is not reprehensible, must remain open.

  Count Helmuth von Moltke, “On the Nature of War” (1880)

  3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

  Commerce diminishes the spirit, both of patriotism and military defense. And history sufficiently informs us, that the bravest achievements were always accomplished in the non-age of a nation… . The more men have to lose, the less willing are they to venture. The rich are in general slaves to fear, and submit to courtly power with the trembling duplicity of a spaniel.

  Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776)

  4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardour damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

  5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

  This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained by any of the commentators. [Six commentators suggest] that a general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: “Haste may be stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they bring calamity in their train.” Wang Hsi evades the difficulty by remarking: “Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such calamities.” Chang Yü says: “So long as victory can be attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness.”

  Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by implication, about ill-considered haste being better than ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish—if only because it means impoverishment to the nation… .

  In considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that of Hannibal’s isolated army, because it seemed to him that the latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their reversal, it is true, led to Cannae [a huge defeat for the Romans under his successor]; but this only establishes a negative presumption in their favour.

  Fabius Maximus Cunctator, Quintus, Roman statesman and military commander, was known as “the Delayer.” His use of long delays in the Second Punic War wore down the resistance of Hannibal’s Car-thaginian army and decimated their supply lines, giving Rome a savage victory. DG

  6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

  We hear war called murder. It is not: it is suicide.

  British Prime Minister James Ramsay MacDonald (1930)

  7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

  That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous effects of a long war can realise the supreme importance of rapidity in bringing it to a close.

  8. The skilful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

  Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in waiting for reinforcements, nor will he turn his army back for fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy’s frontier without delay. This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Buonaparte, the value of time—that is, being a little ahead of your opponent—has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the nicest calculations with regard to commissariat [food supplies].

  I don’t want to get any messages saying, “I am holding my position.” We are not holding a goddamned thing. Let the Germans do that. We are advancing constantly, and we are not interested in holding onto anything except the enemies’ balls… . Our basic plan of operation is to advance and to keep on advancing regardless of whether we have to go over, under, or through the enemy. We are going to go through him like crap through a goose.

  Gen. George S. Patton, speech to the Third Army on the eve of the Allied invasion of France (1944)

  9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

  10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

  11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up, and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

  12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

  13, 14. Wit
h this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their incomes will be dissipated; while Government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantlets, draught-oxen and heavy waggons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

  15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One carload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.

  Because twenty carloads will be consumed in the process of transporting one cartload to the front.

  16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

  Tu Mu says: “Rewards are necessary in order to make the soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his own account.”

  17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

  18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

  19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

  Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war, there is no substitute for victory.

  Gen. Douglas MacArthur, speech at West Point (1962)

  20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

  In Chinese historiography it is still the will of the individual which directs the course of history.