Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Read online

  Geoffrey MacCormack, “Mythology and the Origin of Law in Early Chinese Thought” (2001)

  XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS

  These can include elements of the six geographical features noted in Chapter X, as well as conditions of the army itself—that is, situations as opposed to grounds.

  DG

  The overwhelming lesson the PLA learned from its brushes with the Americans was the need for speed: “In the Liberation War (in China), we might take days to surround a Kuomintang division, then slowly close the circle around it. With the Americans, if we took more than a few hours, they would bring up reinforcements, aircraft, artillery.”

  Yu Xiu, regimental deputy political commissar, on the storming of the 8th Cavalry’s positions (1950)

  Wang Hsi … says: “There are nine military situations, good and bad.”

  1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognises nine varieties of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground; (9) desperate ground.

  2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground.

  So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every direction. “In their advance,” observes Tu Mu, “they will lack the valour of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find harbours of refuge.”

  3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground.

  Tu Mu remarks, “When your army has crossed the border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home.”

  4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground.

  I must apologise for using [“contentious”] in a sense not known to the dictionary, i.e., “to be contended for.” … Ts’ao Kung says: “ground on which the few and the weak can defeat the many and the strong,” such as “the neck of a pass,” instanced by Li Ch’üan. Thus, Thermopylae was [contentious ground], because the possession of it, even for a few days only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus gaining invaluable time. [Wu Tzu writes]: “For those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is nothing better than a narrow pass.”

  When Lü Kuang was returning from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of Ch’in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch’ang, counselled him, saying, “Lü Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two positions.” Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.

  5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground.

  Ts’ao Kung [explains this as] “ground covered with a network of roads,” like a chess-board. Another interpretation, suggested by Ho Shih, is “ground on which intercommunication is easy.” In either case, it must evidently be “flat country,” and therefore [it] “cannot be blocked.”

  6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,

  [Ts’ao Kung writes:] “Our country adjoining the enemy’s and a third country conterminous with both.”

  so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his command,

  China was divided [into a loose confederacy of states] under the Chou dynasty. The belligerent who holds this dominating position can constrain most of them to become his allies.

  is ground of intersecting highways.

  7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is serious ground.

  Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that “when an army has reached such a point, its situation is serious.” Li Ch’üan instances (1) the victorious march of Yo I into the capital of Ch’i in 284 B.C., and (2) the attack on Ch’u, six years later, by the Ch’in general Po Ch’i.

  8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens—all country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.

  Chia Lin explains [steeps, marshes and fens] as ground “that has been ruined by water passing over it,” and Tu Yu simply as “swampy ground.” But Ch’ên Hao says [it refers particularly] to deep hollows—what Chu-ko Liang [designated] “earth-hells.”

  9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our men: this is hemmed-in ground.

  10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

  As pictured by Ts’ao Kung, … here escape is no longer possible: “A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, advance impossible, retreat blocked.” Ch’ên Hao says: “To be on ‘desperate ground’ is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching in a burning house.”

  Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: “Suppose an army is invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides:—it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy’s mercy. A ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, the enemy in overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment’s respite.

  “If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the enemy’s attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out; all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten thousand; all means of offence in the hands of the enemy, all points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:—in this terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the slightest effect?”

  Students of Greek history may be reminded of the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the Athenians under Nicias and Demosthenes.

  11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.

  But [according to Ts’ao Kung] rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the advantageous position first. Li Ch’üan and others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has already forestalled us, so that it would be sheer madness to attack… .

  When the King of Wu inquires what should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: “The rule with regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him away by pretending to flee—show your banners and sound your drums—make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to lose—trail brushwood and raise a dust—confound his ears a
nd eyes—detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue.”

  12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy’s way.

  Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the blocking force itself to serious risks [this interpretation follows] that of Chang Yü. [Another interpretation] is indicated in Ts’ao Kung’s brief note: “Draw closer together”—i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut off. Wang Hsi points out that “open ground” is only another name for the “accessible ground” described in chapter X, paragraph 2, and says that the advice here given is simply a variation of “keep a sharp eye on the line of supplies,” be careful that your communications are not cut.

  On ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your allies.

  Or perhaps, “form alliances with neighbouring states.”

  No people on earth can be held, as a people, to be an enemy, for all humanity shares the common hunger for peace and fellowship and justice. No nation’s security and well-being can be lastingly achieved in isolation but only in effective cooperation with fellow-nations.

  President Dwight David Eisenhower, “The Chance for Peace” (1953)

  13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.

  On this, Li Ch’üan has the following delicious note: “When an army penetrates far into the enemy’s country, care must be taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch’in territory [in 207 B.C.] was marked by no violation of women or looting of valuables. Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, then, I think that the true reading must be, not ‘plunder,’ but ‘do not plunder.’ ” Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy commentator’s feelings outran his judgment.

  Tu Mu, at least, has no such illusions. He says: “When encamped on ‘serious ground,’ there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, and keep a close watch on the enemy.”

  In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

  Or, in the words of chapter VIII, paragraph 2, “do not encamp.”

  14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.

  Ts’ao Kung says: “Try the effect of some unusual artifice”; and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: “In such a position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the peril may be escaped.” This is exactly what happened on the famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the Dictator Fabius.

  The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle his foes was remarkably like that which T’ien Tan had also employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See the note for chapter IX, paragraph 24.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal’s army passed safely through the defile.

  On desperate ground, fight.

  For, as Chia Lin remarks, “if you fight with all your might, there is a chance of life; whereas death is certain if you cling to your corner.”

  15. Those who were called skilful leaders of old knew how to drive a wedge between the enemy’s front and rear; to prevent cooperation between his large and small divisions; to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from rallying their men.

  16. When the enemy’s men were scattered, they prevented them from concentrating; even when their forces were united, they managed to keep them in disorder.

  17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

  Mei Yao-ch’ên connects this with the foregoing: “Having succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were.”

  18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I should say: “Begin by seizing something which your opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will.”

  Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts’ao Kung thinks it is “some strategical advantage on which the enemy is depending.” Tu Mu says: “The three things which an enemy is anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success depends, are: (1) to capture our favourable positions; (2) to ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications.” Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three directions and thus render him helpless.

  But … I agree with Ch’ên Hao, who says [the text] does not refer only to strategical advantages, but is any person or thing that may happen to be of importance to the enemy. By boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the other side on the defensive.

  19. Rapidity is the essence of war:

  According to Tu Mu, “this is a summary of leading principles in warfare,” and he adds: “These are the profoundest truths of military science, and the chief business of the general.”

  The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, show the importance attached to speed by two of China’s greatest generals. In 227 A.D., Mêng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch’êng under the Wei Emperor Wên Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military governor of Wan, and getting wind of Mêng Ta’s treachery, he at once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. Ssu-ma’s officers came to him and said: “If Mêng Ta has leagued himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly investigated before we make a move.” Ssu-ma I replied: “Mêng Ta is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the mask.”

  Then, by a series of forced marches, he brought his army under the walls of Hsin-ch’êng within the space of eight days. Now Mêng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: “Wan is 1200 li from here. When the news of my revolt reaches Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his Imperial Master, but it will be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are not worth troubling about.” The next letter, however, was filled with consternation: “Though only eight days have passed since I threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. What miraculous rapidity is this!” A fortnight later, Hsin-ch’êng had fallen and Mêng Ta had lost his head.

  In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from K’uei-chou in Ssu-ch’uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for navigation.

  Li Ching replied: “To the soldier, overwhelming speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See note for chapter VII, paragraph 19.] This is the great principle in war. Even if he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his soldiers in such a hurry that they will no
t be fit to oppose us. Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours.” All came about as he had predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer the penalty of death.

  take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.

  20. The following are the principles to be observed by an invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

  21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your army with food.

  22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,

  [Wang Hsi says:] “Pet them, humour them, give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them generally.”

  As you know that the Credit of the Service depends not only on dealing fairly with the men Employed in it, but on their belief that they are and will be fairly dealt with.

  John Paul Jones, establishing rules for naval conduct (1777)

  and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your strength.

  Ch’ên recalls the line of action taken in 224 B.C. by the famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded the Ch’u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In vain did the Ch’u general try to force a battle: day after day Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to weld them into a loyal and homogeneous body.

  After some time had elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By this time the Ch’u army, after repeating their challenge again and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch’in general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch’u was conquered by Ch’in, and the king Fu-ch’u led into captivity.