Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Page 12

  towns which must not be besieged,

  Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own experience. When invading the territory of Hsü-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. Chang Yü says: “No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble.” Hsün Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: “The city is small and well-fortified; even if I succeed in taking it, it will be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock.”

  In the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war. It was [Marshal] Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and manœuvres. He said: “It is a great mistake to waste men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a province.”

  positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

  This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim: “Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of civil order!” The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.

  I’ve always taken it for granted that the Führer left the command of the army to me. This crazy order has come like a bombshell. He can’t just blindly apply experience he gained in Russia to the war in Africa. He should have left the decision here to me… . Until this moment, we in Africa had always had complete freedom of action. Now that was over… . An overwhelming bitterness welled up in us when we saw the superlative spirit of the army, in which every man, from the highest to the lowest, knew that even the greatest effort could no longer change the course of battle.

  Field Marshal Rommel, on Adolf Hitler’s interference and the German defeat at El Alamein (1942)

  4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.

  5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

  Literally, “get the advantage of the ground,” which means not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in every possible way. Chang Yü says: “Every kind of ground is characterised by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How is it possible to turn these natural features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?”

  6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.

  Chia Lin … tells us that these imply five obvious and generally advantageous lines of action, namely: “If a certain road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed.” But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages.

  For instance, “a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking,” and so on… . Hence we see the uselessness of knowing the one without the other—of having an eye for weaknesses in the enemy’s armour without being clever enough to recast one’s plans on the spur of the moment.

  7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

  “Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one,” says Ts’ao Kung, “the opposite state should be always present to your mind.”

  Our strategy is “pit one against ten,” and our tactics are “pit ten against one.” These contrary and yet complementary propositions constitute one of our principles for gaining mastery over the enemy.

  Mao Tse-tung, Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War (1936)

  8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.

  Tu Mu [says]: “If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into our calculations.”

  9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from misfortune.

  A translator cannot emulate the conciseness of [the original Chinese, which reads, word for word] “to blend [thoughts of advantage] with disadvantage,” but the meaning is as given. Tu Mu says: “If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself … For instance, if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils.”

  Fortune favors the brave.

  Terence, Phormio (c.161 B.C.)

  Death is nothing. But to live defeated and without glory, that is to die every day.

  Napoleon I (1804)

  10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;

  Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury … :—“Entice away the enemy’s best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counsellors. Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women.” Chang Yü (after Wang Hsi) [says]: “Get the enemy … into a position where he must suffer injury, and he will submit of his own accord.”

  make trouble for them, and keep them constantly engaged;

  Literally [with reference to the latter phrase], “make servants of them.” Tu Yu says: “Prevent them from having any rest.”

  hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.

  Mêng Shih’s note … : “Cause them to forget pien (the reasons for acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction.”

  11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

  12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;

  “Bravery without forethought,” as Ts’ao Kung analyses it, which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yü, “must not be encountered with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain.” [Wu Tzu says:] “In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned.” Ssu-ma Fa, too, makes the incisive remark, “Simply going to one’s
death does not bring about victory.”

  (2) cowardice, which leads to capture;

  Ts’ao Kung [describes the coward as] the man “whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an advantage,” and Wang Hsi adds, “who is quick to flee at the sight of danger.” Mêng Shih gives the closer paraphrase “he who is bent on returning alive,” that is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T’ai Kung said: “He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently bring upon himself real disaster.”

  In 404 A.D., Liu Yü pursued the rebel Huan Hsüan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle with him at the island of Ch’êng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan Hsüan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should he be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the utmost ardour to be first in the fray, Huan Hsüan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and nights without stopping.

  Chang Yü tells a somewhat similar story of Chao Ying-Ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get across.

  Cowards do not count in battle; they are there but not in it.

  Euripides, Meleager (fifth century B.C.)

  (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;

  Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsiang, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei, Têng Ch’iang and others, shut himself up behind his walls and refused to fight. Têng Ch’iang said: “Our adversary is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to be our prey.” This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to fight, was lured on as far as San-yüan by the enemy’s pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.

  (4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;

  This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’ên truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: “The seeker after glory should be careless of public opinion.”

  (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and trouble.

  Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasise is the danger of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military instincts.

  It is now generally admitted that [Britain’s] repeated efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of [the] generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was always “so good to his men.” By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu’s mouth.

  A prince who gets a reputation for good nature in the first year of his reign, is laughed at in the second.

  Napoleon I, letter to the King of Holland (1807)

  13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the conduct of war.

  14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.

  IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH

  The conduct of war … consists in the planning and conduct of fighting… . [Fighting] consists of a greater or lesser number of single acts, each complete in itself, which … are called “engagements.” … This gives rise to the completely different activity of planning and executing these engagements themselves, and of coordinating each of them with the others in order to further the object of the war. One has been called tactics, and the other, strategy.”

  Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1832)

  1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighbourhood of valleys.

  The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to keep close to supplies of water and grass… . [Compare this to Wu Tzu, who says:] “Abide not in natural ovens”; i.e., “the openings of large valleys.” Chang Yü tells the following anecdote: “Wu-tu Ch’iang was a robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yüan was sent to exterminate his gang. Ch’iang having found a refuge in the hills, Ma Yüan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all the favourable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. Ch’iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did not know the advantage of keeping in the neighbourhood of valleys.”

  2. Camp in high places,

  Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above the surrounding country.

  facing the sun.

  Tu Mu takes this to mean “facing south,” and Ch’ên Hao “facing east.”

  Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

  3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.

  “In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you,” according to Ts’ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yü, “in order not to be impeded in your evolutions.”

  4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.

  Li Ch’üan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over Lung Chü at the Wei River … : “The two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks filled with sand and construct a dam a little higher up. Then, leading half his army across, he attacked Lung Chü; but after a time, pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to the other bank. “Lung Chü was much elated by this unlooked-for success, and exclaiming, “I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a coward!” he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented the greater portion of Lung Chü’s army from getting across. He then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and annihilated it, Lung Chü himself being amongst the slain. The rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in all directions.”

  5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.

  6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the sun.

  Chang Yü has the note: “Said either of troops marshalled on the river-bank, or of boats anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to be higher than the enemy and facing the sun.”

  Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.

  Tu Mu says: “As water flows downwards, we must not pitch our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood… . Chu-ko Wu-hou has remarked that ‘in river warfare, we must not advance against the stream,’ which is as much as to say that our fleet must not be anchored below that of the
enemy, for then they would be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of us.” There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to us.

  So much for river warfare.

  7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.

  Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and exposed to attack.

  8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.

  Li Ch’üan remarks that the ground is less likely to be treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Yu says that they will serve to protect the rear.

  So much for operations in salt-marshes.

  9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible position

  Tu Mu explains it as “ground that is smooth and firm,” and therefore adapted for cavalry; Chang Yü as “level ground, free from depressions and hollows.” He adds later on that although Sun Tzu is discussing flat country, there will nevertheless be slight elevations and hillocks.

  with rising ground to your right and on your rear,

  Tu Mu quotes T’ai Kung as saying: “An army should have a stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its right.”

  so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So much for campaigning in flat country.

  10. These are the four useful branches of military knowledge

  Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, (3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon’s “Military Maxims,” no. 1.

  which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several sovereigns.

  Ts’ao Kung’s explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor was the first to institute the feudal system of vassal princes, each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of Emperor. Li Ch’üan tells us that the art of war originated under Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Fêng Hou.