Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) Page 11

  doing a hundred li in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.

  8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will reach its destination.

  The moral is, as Ts’ao Kung and others point out: Don’t march a hundred li to gain a tactical advantage, either with or without impedimenta. Manœuvres of this description should be confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: “The hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the dangers of battle.” He did not often call upon his troops for extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he sacrificed everything to speed.

  9. If you march fifty li in order to outmanœuvre the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half your force will reach the goal.

  Literally, “the leader of the first division will be torn away.” [From the Tso Chuan, 19th year:] “This is a case of [the falling tree] tearing up its roots.”

  Like so many texts in a literature as vast and ancient as China’s, the reference to the Tso chuan comes with a step-ladder provenance and mysteries of its own. The Tso chuan—the Tso Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals—existed by the early Han Dynasty. When precisely is open to question, but its import is unquestionable.

  Chinese intellectual activity, from poetry to military tracts, builds upon references to a long intellectual past, especially to what are known as the Five Classics. Consequently, idioms and points of reference can transmit encyclopedic layers of meaning in astonishingly brief lines. Along with the Kung-yung and the Ku-liang commentaries, the Tso chuan sets out to explain the background and significance of the events related in the fifth of the great Five Classics, the Ch’un-Ch’iu, or the Spring and Autumn Annals. Employing extremely laconic language, it chronicles events in the state of Lu from 722 to 481 B.C. The Annals were essential study for China’s educated classes across the millennia. Asian scholar William Theodore de Bary notes that they were regarded “not only as the final authority upon questions of ancient history … but as the embodiment of moral law … and the source of all wisdom and right knowledge.” Therefore, any reference to the Classics or to the commentaries on them is the same as citing the final authority on a subject. DG

  10. If you march thirty li with the same object, two-thirds of your army will arrive.

  In the T’ung Tien [Tu Yu’s encyclopedic treatise on the Constitution] is added: “From this we may know the difficulty of manœuvring.”

  11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost.

  This is explained by Tu Yu as “fodder and the like”; by Tu Mu and Chang Yü as “goods in general”; and by Wang Hsi as “fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc.” But I think what Sun Tzu meant was “stores and accumulated in dépôts,” as distinguished from … the various impedimenta accompanying an army on its march.

  12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbours.

  13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.

  14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.

  15. In war, practise dissimulation, and you will succeed. Move only if there is a real advantage to be gained.

  16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must be decided by circumstances.

  17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,

  The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch’ên points out, “invisible and leaves no tracks.”

  your compactness that of the forest.

  Mêng Shih [notes]: “When slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved”—so as to guard against surprise attacks. But natural forests do not grow in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density or compactness.

  18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, in immovability like a mountain.

  That is [with reference to the latter], when holding a position from which the enemy is trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is trying to entice you into a trap.

  19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

  Tu Yu quotes a saying of T’ai Kung which has passed into a proverb: “You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes to the lightning—so rapid are they.” Likewise, an attack should be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.

  20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be divided amongst your men;

  Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst all.

  when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

  Ch’ên Hao also says: “Quarter your soldiers on the land, and let them sow and plant it.” It is by acting on this principle, and harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch’ao, who penetrated to the Caspian Sea.

  21. Ponder and deliberate

  Note that both these words [in English and in Chinese] are really metaphors derived from the use of scales.

  before you make a move.

  Chang Yü quotes [another commentator] as saying that we must not break camp until we have gauged the resisting power of the enemy and the cleverness of the opposing general.

  22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation. Such is the art of manœuvring.

  With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this fragment is not noticeably different from that of Sun Tzu himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its genuineness.

  23. The Book of Army Management says:

  It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-Ch’ên calls it “an ancient military classic,” and Wang Hsi, “an old book on war.” Considering the enormous amount of fighting that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu’s time between the various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been made and written down at some earlier period.

  On the field of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.

  24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focussed on one particular point.

  Chang Yü says: “If sight and hearing converge simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a million soldiers will be like those of a single man!”

  25. The host thus forming a single united body, it is impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the cowardly to retreat alone.

  Chang Yü quotes a saying: “Equally guilty are those who advance against orders and those who retreat against orders.” Tu Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch’i, when he was fighting against the Ch’in State. Before the battle had begun, one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. Wu Ch’i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer ventured to remonstrate, saying; “This man was a good soldier, and ought not to have been beheaded.” Wu Ch’i replied, “I fully believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he acted without orders.”

  This is the art of handlin
g large masses of men.

  26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

  Ch’ên Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi’s night ride to Ho-yang at the head of 500 mounted men [c.760 A.D.]; they made such an imposing display with torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssü-ming had a large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.

  27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;

  “In war,” says Chang Yü, “if a spirit of anger can be made to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy’s soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to wait until their ardour and enthusiasm have worn off, and then strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen spirit.”

  Li Ch’üan and others tell an anecdote [in the Tso Chuan] of Ts’ao Kuei, a protégé of Duke Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch’i, and the Duke was about to join battle at Ch’ang-cho, after the first roll of the enemy’s drums, when Ts’ao said, “Not just yet.” Only after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch’i were utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the meaning of his delay, Ts’ao Kuei replied, “In battle, a courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our victory.” [The writer Wu Tzu] puts “spirit” first among the “four important influences” in war, and continues: “The value of a whole army—a mighty host of a million men—is dependent on one man alone: Such is the influence of spirit!”

  a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind. Chang Yü says: “Presence of mind is the general’s most important asset. It is the quality which enables him to discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic-stricken.” The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a saying: “Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include the art of assailing the enemy’s mental equilibrium.”

  Intellect and education play a more prominent part in war than stamina and courage.

  George Francis Robert Henderson and Sir Thomas Barclay, “War,” Encyclopedia Britannica, eleventh edition (1910)

  28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning;

  Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to fight fasting, whereas Hannibal’s men had breakfasted at their leisure.

  by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

  29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

  30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the art of retaining self-possession.

  31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.

  32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is the art of studying circumstances.

  33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

  34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

  35. Do not swallow a bait offered by the enemy. Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

  The commentators explain [the latter] piece of advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yü quotes the words of Han Hsin: “Invincible is the soldier who hath his desire and returneth homewards.” A marvellous tale is told of Ts’ao Ts’ao’s courage and resource … : In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts’ao’s retreat. The latter was obliged to draw off his troops, only to find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself.

  In this desperate plight, Ts’ao waited until nightfall, when he bored a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. Then he marched on with his baggage-train, and when it grew light, Chang Hsiu, finding that the bird had flown, pressed after him in hot pursuit. As soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on its rear, while Ts’ao himself turned and met his pursuers in front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. Ts’ao Ts’ao said afterwards, “The brigands tried to check my army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate position; hence I knew how to overcome them.”

  36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.

  This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is “to make him believe that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting with the courage of despair.” Tu Mu adds pleasantly: “After that, you may crush him.”

  Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

  Ch’ên Hao quotes the saying, “Birds and beasts when brought to bay will use their claws and teeth.” Chang Yü says: “If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, he must not be pushed to extremities.” …

  Ho Shih illustrates the meaning by a story taken from the life of Fu Yen-Ch’ing… . That general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei, was surrounded by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at last Fu Yen-Ch’ing exclaimed, “We are desperate men. Far better to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into captivity!”

  A strong gale happened to be blowing from the northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. Tu Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-chêng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: “They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally.” Accordingly, Fu Yen-Ch’ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded in breaking through to safety.

  37. Such is the art of warfare.

  I take it that these words conclude the extract from the Book of Army Management, which began at paragraph 23.

  VIII. VARIATION OF TACTICS

  There is required for the composition of a great commander not only massive common sense and reasoning power, not only imagination, but also an element of legerdemain, an original and sinister touch, which leaves the enemy puzzled as well as beaten.

  Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (1923)

  The heading means literally “The Nine Variations,” but, as Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us (chapter V, paragraphs 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that “Nine” stands for an indefinitely large number: “All it means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost degree.” … The only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a supposition to which the unusual shortnes
s of the chapter lends some weight.

  1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.

  Repeated from chapter VII, paragraph 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to the chapter.

  2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.

  Chang Yü [defines the last-named situation as being] situated across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch’üan says it is “country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood”; Chia Lin, “one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to advance.”

  In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate position, you must fight.

  Chang Yü has an important note here… . : “The reason why only five [of the nine variations] are given is that the subject is treated en précis… All kinds of ground have corresponding military positions, and also a variation of tactics suitable to each… . [But] he wishes here to speak of the Five Advantages, so he begins by setting forth the Nine Variations. These are inseparably connected in practice, and therefore they are dealt with together.” The weak point of this argument is the suggestion that “five things” can stand as … an abstract or abridgment of nine, when those that are omitted are not less important than those that appear, and when one of the latter is not included amongst the nine at all.

  3. There are roads which must not be followed,

  “Especially those leading through narrow defiles,” says Li Ch’üan, “where an ambush is to be feared.”

  armies which must not be attacked,

  More correctly, perhaps, “there are times when an army must not be attacked.” Ch’ên Hao says: “When you see your way to obtain a trivial advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength.”